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Abstract
The paper investigates whether deviations from the law of one price
can attributed to real factors, such as transportation and distribution
costs. Even if trade is costly, the prices of a good at di.erent locations
will be linked as long as the good is traded. Instead of the usual
iceberg assumption, I model costly trade as a transportation sector
that uses real resources with potentially different factor intensities
than the production of the good.
First I use a latent factor model to see if distance specific
(￿transportation￿) and location specific (￿retailing￿) factors can
explain deviations from the law of one price across U.S. cities. For
many products, these two factors explain 10-20% of all the variation
in prices. The estimated transportation factor tends to move together
with oil prices.
Next I derive the variance of relative prices at di.erent locations when
the price of transportation is determined in general equilibrium. This
variance is high if (i) the good is costly to transport and (ii) it is
produced with different factor intensities than transportation.
Preliminary empirical results suggest that goods similar to
transportation in terms of factor intensity have indeed lower relative
price variability. As these goods tend to be costly to ship, this helps
resolve the puzzling finding of Engel and Rogers (2001) that less
tradable goods have less volatile relative prices.MŰHELYTANULM`NYOK DISCUSSION PAPERS
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KOREN MIKLÓS
A KÉT ÁR TÖRVÉNYE: KERESKEDELMI KÖLTSÉGEK ÉS
A RELATÍV ÁRAK VÁLTOZÉKONYSÁGA
Összefoglalás
A dolgozat azt vizsgÆlja, hogy az egy Ær t￿rvØnyØtől vett eltØrØsek meny-
nyiben tulajdon￿that￿k olyan reÆl-k￿ltsØgeknek, mint a szÆll￿tÆsi Øs el-
osztÆsi k￿ltsØgek. MØg pozit￿v kereskedelmi k￿ltsØgek esetØn is szigorœ
￿sszef￿ggØs van egyazon termØk kØt k￿l￿nb￿ző helyen fizetendő Æra k￿-
z￿tt. A szokÆsos "jØghegy-feltevØs" helyett k￿l￿n iparÆgkØnt modellezem
a szÆll￿tÆst, amely ugyanazokat a tØnyezőket hasznÆlja, mint a termelØs,
de esetlegesen eltØrő tØnyezőintenzitÆssal.
Elősz￿r egy faktor modell keretØben megvizsgÆlom, hogy az Egyes￿lt
`llamok vÆrosai k￿zti ÆreltØrØsek milyen mØrtØkben magyarÆzhat￿ak tÆ-
volsÆgf￿ggő ("szÆll￿tÆs") vagy helyf￿ggő faktorokkal ("kiskereskede-
lem"). Ez a kØt faktor az ÆreltØrØsek 10-20 szÆzalØkÆt magyarÆzza. A tÆ-
volsÆgf￿ggő faktor (amit a szÆll￿tÆs ÆrakØnt Ørtelmezhet￿nk) egy￿tt mo-
zog az olajÆrral.
Amennyiben a szÆll￿tÆs ÆrÆt ÆltalÆnos egyensœlyban hatÆrozzuk meg,
abb￿l levezethető kØt vÆros relat￿v Ærainak vÆltozØkonysÆga. Egy adott
termØk esetØn ez a vÆltozØkonysÆg akkor magas, ha (i) a termØk drÆgÆn
szÆll￿that￿ Øs (ii) a termØk termelØse eltØrő tØnyezőket hasznÆl, mint a
szÆll￿tÆsa. Az előzetes empirikus eredmØnyek megerős￿tik azt az Æll￿tÆst,
hogy a szÆll￿tÆshoz hasonl￿ tØnyező ￿sszetØtelű termØkek relat￿v ÆrÆnak
kisebb a varianciÆja. Mivel ezek tipikusan drÆgÆn szÆll￿that￿ termØkek,
az eredmØny konzisztens Engel Øs Rogers (2001) meglepő eredmØnyØvel,
amely szerint a nehezen "kereskedhető" termØkek relat￿v Æra kevØsbØ in-
gadozik.1. INTRODUCTION
The large discrepancy of prices at different locations has been a puzzle for
international economists. Integrated markets should obey the “law of one price”
(LOOP), that is, the same good should sell for the same price irrespective of
location. In reality, they do not, which generated an enormous empirical literature
documenting the patterns and causes of deviations from the LOOP.
This paper investigates whether trade costs can explain deviations from the LOOP
(DLOOP). In particular, I ask how the cross-sectional and time-series patterns of
DLOOP can be related to costs of transportation and retailing. Empirical studies on
the DLOOP usually focus on (i) the cross-sectional dispersion of prices, or, in
absence of actual price level, (ii) the time series volatility of relative price indices at
different locations, and (iii) the speed of mean reversion in the DLOOP. As I argue
later, they do so with little theoretical underpinning, assuming that more integrated
markets (associated with lower trade costs) exhibit (i) lower price dispersion, (ii)
less volatile relative price, and (iii) faster reversion to the LOOP. I show that the
validity of these assumptions in general depends on the technology of transportation
and retailing. In fact, empirical studies typically find bigger cross sectional
dispersion of prices for goods that are costly to trade but fail to uncover such
patterns for the time-series volatility of relative prices.
From a macroeconomic point of view, the DLOOP be formulated as the “purchasing
power parity (PPP) puzzle,” so coined by Rogo. (1996), who shows that deviations
from PPP (i.e., real exchange rate fluctuations) are large and persistent. Neoclassical
explanations that point to the relative price of tradable and nontradable goods
(Balassa and Samuelson) have little hope for success since Engel (1999) has shown
that this relative price explains very little of the U.S. real exchange rate: the bulk of
the variability comes from fluctuation of the relative price of traded goods. This
suggests that the law of one price may not even hold for individual goods.
In turn, a number of papers have looked at more disaggregate goods. Perhaps the
most striking .nding is due to Engel and Rogers (1996), who look at the variability
of the consumer price index of goods in different U.S. and Canadian cities. Even in
such integrated economies, relative prices vary wildly, especially if the two
locations under scrutiny are on different sides of the border. Engel and Rogers
(1998) and (2001) provide further analysis of the issue. A puzzling finding is that
nontraded goods have lower inter-city price variability then traded goods.TRADE COSTS AND RELATIVE PRICE VARIABILITY 3
If data permits, it is useful to look at actual price levels of well de-
ﬁned goods instead of price indices of good categories. This is what
Parsley and Wei (1996) do when they look at the prices of 51 prod-
ucts in 48 U.S. cities. They study the speed of mean reversion of
DLOOP. Parsley and Wei (1997) take this approach to Japanese and
U.S. data, again conﬁrming that there is substantial variation of good
prices across locations, an overwhelming majority of which is explained
by the “border eﬀect.”
Similar chords are struck by Froot, Kim and Rogoﬀ (1997), who
use a historical dataset of various commodity prices in England and
Holland to demonstrate that the variability of relative prices in the
two countries have remained large in spite of the deﬁnite trends of
trade integration.
What is common in these studies is that they are tacit about the
theoretical determinants of relative price variability. Theory suggests
that the existence of any relative price discrepancy indicates that mar-
kets are segregated but oﬀers no further clues to assess the magnitude
of this segregation.
1
A possible reason for this silence is that existing theories do not
predict relative price variability even in the case of large trade costs.
Assume, for instance, that shipping a good from location i to location
j entails a proportional transportation cost, τ. That is, one has to ship
(1+τ) units of the good to ensure that 1 unit arrives. This is the famous
“iceberg” assumption of Samuelson (1954). If the good produced at
location i is sold at both locations then the following relationship pins
down the relative price,
(1.1) pj =( 1+τ)pi.
The good will be more expensive at location j because of the trade
cost but the relative price at the two locations will always be (1 + τ).
That is, as long as good in question is traded, the iceberg assumption
implies no variability in relative prices.
1An exception is the recent study by Bravo-Ortega and di Giovanni (2004), which
uses the multicountry Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to theoretically
pin down the volatility of the real exchange rate. However, they are concerned with
the real exchange rate and not the relative price of tradable goods. Also, the channel
they propose—the relative importance of nontraded goods—is diﬀerent from ours.4M I K L ´ OS KOREN
What if the transport cost is so high that region j ceases to import
the good from region i?T h e npj will be lower than (1+τ)pi and (1.1)
will only hold as an inequality. The reverse should also be true, that is,
the price in region i cannot be higher than (1+τ)pj. This implies that
the relative price is bounded between the following “arbitrage points,”
1/(1 + τ) ≤ pj/pi ≤ 1+τ.
If transport costs comprise 4% of the value of the good, arbitrage pre-
vents the relative price from being higher than 1.04 or lower than 0.96.
The higher the proportional transport cost, the wider the potential
range of relative prices. This oﬀers an intuitive connection between
trade costs and relative price variability that is often cited in empirical
studies.2
Note, however, that both strict inequalities can only hold if the good
is not traded at all, that is, if markets are completely segmented. Even
if a small amount is shipped from region i to region j,t h el a wo fo n e
price should still hold for “factory gate” prices.3 We should observe
imports of the good to region j at the upper bound of the no-arbitrage
band, exports at the lower bound, and zero trade in between. The
arbitrage band approach is hence inconsistent with the existence of
persistent trade ﬂows. Campa and Wolf (1997) also pointed this out,
observing that there is no clear relationship between the volume of
trade and the deviation from the law of one price.
This paper proposes an alternative approach to trade costs. I as-
sume that transportation (as well as distribution and retail) uses the
same factors of production as the ﬁnal goods. It is important, though,
that it may use diﬀerent techniques, in particular, transportation may
use diﬀerent factors intensively than production. This means that the
relative price of transportation is not necessarily constant as assumed
2See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for an excellent survey of the trade cost
literature. Dumas (1992) oﬀers an explicit derivation of these pricing points in a
dynamic general equilibrium model.
3Here I make the assumption that goods are sold under perfect competition,
that is, they are priced at marginal cost. Note that the same reasoning would
apply if an imperfectly competitive supplier of the good applied the same markup
in both regions. In most international macro models that use Dixit-Stiglitz-type
monopolistic competition this will indeed be the case in equilibrium. Exploring
how markups diﬀer with destinations is an exciting question for future research.TRADE COSTS AND RELATIVE PRICE VARIABILITY 5
in the iceberg model. However, the more similar the sector is to trans-
portation, the better the iceberg model approximates trade costs.
As I show below, the two key determinants of relative price variability
are (i) the magnitude of trade costs, and (ii) the similarity of producing
the good to the transportation sector. In particular, relative prices
are volatile if transport costs are high and the sector is suﬃciently
diﬀerent from transportation. For example, fuel is relatively costly to
transport (input-output tables of the U.S. show that around 9% of
all fuel shipments is spent on transportation), yet the volatility of its
inter-city relative price is among the lowest of all goods (see Table 4
in Engel and Rogers, 2001). This may be because transportation is
highly fuel-intensive and the iceberg assumption (which, recall, implies
no variability) approximates the shipping of fuels quite well.
Previous empirical studies failed to link relative price variability to
trade costs. Even if more distant cities (countries) tend to have more
volatile relative prices, the cross-sectoral patterns are contradicting this
evidence: nontraded goods have lower volatility across U.S. cities than
traded goods (Engel and Rogers, 2001). I show that this counterintu-
itive ﬁnding is the result of an omitted variable bias. Since transporta-
tion uses similar factors as nontraded goods (especially if we deﬁne
transportation broadly to include wholesale and retail trade), the fail-
ure to account for similarity to transportation makes nontraded goods
look less costly to trade. Controlling for both similarity and transport
costs overturns this result and shows that high transport costs do lead
to more price variability.
A number of recent studies in international macroeconomics have
abandoned the traditional iceberg cost approach to analyze relative
prices. Bergin and Glick (2004) work with heterogeneous transport
margins across goods. The sets of traded and nontraded goods will then
endogenously respond to price ﬂuctuations. This causes the average
transport margin for traded goods to ﬂuctuate with domestic prices,
generating additional ﬂuctuations in the real exchange rate. In contrast
to their approach, in my model the transport margin ﬂuctuates with
changes in the relative price of transportation. This channel is probably
more important than changes in the set of traded goods over short
horizons. Ghironi and Melitz (2003) focus on the ﬁxed cost of entering6M I K L ´ OS KOREN
export markets and ﬁrm heterogeneity. The real exchange rate in their
framework depends the set of ﬁrms that engage in exports, also likely
to change only over long horizons.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First I introduce a
partial equilibrium exercise of decomposing deviations from the law of
one price into transportation costs and local distribution costs. Second,
I relate these two trade costs to the prices of tradable goods in a general
equilibrium framework by comparing the factor intensities of sectors.
2. Trade Costs and Deviations from the Law of One Price
Take a single tradable product g produced and sold at two locations,
i and j.L e tcgit denote the producer price (marginal cost) of the good
at location i at time t, τgd
γ
ij the amount of transportation (in tonmiles,
say) required to move the good between the two locations (where dij is
the distance between the two locations), λt the price of transportation,
and µg the amount of distribution (e.g., in units of retail space and
labor hours) and rit the price of distribution of at location i. Suppose
location i is a net exporter of the good. In this case, the consumer
prices of the good at the two locations are
pgit = cgit + µgrit,
pgjt = cgjt + µgrjt = cgit ± τgd
γ
ijλt + µgrjt,
and the ± sign indicates an addition for goods exported from region i
to j and a substraction otherwise.
The absolute deviation from the law of one price is hence
|pgjt − pgit| = τgd
γ
ijλt + µg|rjt − rit|.
The two factors behind the deviation from the law of one price are
shipping costs and relative retail costs. First I try to identify these
two types of costs in the data to see how much of the deviations they
explain. The key problem is that none of these costs is observable
(though imperfect proxies may exist). I will hence treat them as unob-
served factors in a latent factor model. The assumptions that identify
these factors are:
(1) Total transport costs of good g between regions i and j only
depend on the distance between the two regions. In particular,
they do not depend on the identities of the regions.TRADE COSTS AND RELATIVE PRICE VARIABILITY 7
(2) The price of transportation (λt)i sc o m m o na c r o s sa l lg o o d sa n d
regions. (Later I will allow for diﬀerent modes of transportation
varying with the good and distance, as can be deduced from the
Commodity Flow Survey.)
(3) Distribution costs aﬀect good g to the same extent in all regions.
(4) The price of distribution (rit) is common to all goods within a
region.
However, these are insuﬃcient to separately identify the transport
(distance-speciﬁc) and the retail (location-speciﬁc) factors in any cross
section of cities. The reason is that the following are observationally
equivalent: (i) transportation becomes more expensive, (ii) retailing
becoming more expensive proportionally to distance to the benchmark
city. The additional identiﬁcation restriction I use is that in any com-
parison to the benchmark city there are as many “exported” products
as “imported” products. (See study on European real exchange rates.)
This is an ad hoc assumption to separate the impact of distance- and
location-speciﬁc factors. However, it does not aﬀect the estimation of
the joint impact of these factors. I will work out an N-region version of
the model later and use trade data from the Commodity Flow Survey.
3. Trade Costs in General Equilibrium
Let us turn to how the price of transportation is determined in gen-
eral equilibrium. (I omit retailing in this section for ease of exposition.)
Consider the following 2 × 2 × 2 model. Country 1 exports good 1,
imports good 2.4 Technologies are CRS and the same across countries.
There are three sectors: good 1 with cost function c1(w.1,w .2), good
2 with cost function c2(w.1,w .2) and freight transportation with cost
function c0(w.1,w .2).5 Factor prices may diﬀer in the two countries, the
dots in the subscript then must be replace by an index of the given
country. One unit of transportation is used for every unit of exports
and every unit of imports. (This symmetry could be easily broken.)
4I use the word “country” interchangably with “region.”
5Transportation can be interpreted broadly to include any activity that is needed
to export and import goods. We assume that these activities exhibit constant
returns to scale so their marginal cost is constant.8M I K L ´ OS KOREN
Factors are mobile within a country but immobile across countries.
This ensures that factor prices are equal across sectors within a country.
This will pin down the relative prices of goods. Intuitively, if there are
as many traded goods as factors, then factor rewards are determined
by the goods prices. These factor prices then determine the relative
price of transportation. In general equilibrium, of course, these eﬀects
take place simultaneously.
Consumers derive utility from both goods but do not care about
the locality of the good. (A home bias could be easily built in by
just indexing goods produced in the two countries separately.) Price
ﬂuctuations are driven by demand shocks, that is, the marginal utility
of consuming good i in country h is subject to taste shock ehi:
U1 = u1(c11/e11,c 12/e12), (3.1)
U2 = u2(c21/e21,c 22/e22). (3.2)
For now I make no assumptions about the joint distribution of taste
shocks across goods and countries. Also, utilities need not be identical
or homothetic.
The world good prices relate to the domestic prices as follows.
p11 = pw1 − c0(w11,w 12) (3.3)
p12 = pw2 + c0(w11,w 12) (3.4)
p21 = pw1 + c0(w21,w 22) (3.5)
p22 = pw2 − c0(w21,w 22). (3.6)
Note that world prices would only be observable in the “ether” between
the two countries but I keep referring to them for ease of exposition.
As long as we are in the interior of the cone of specialization, both
countries produce both goods and domestic consumer prices are equal
to the marginal cost of production,
pjs = cs(wj1,w j2). (3.7)
The rest of the equilibrium conditions relate quantities demanded to
quantities supplied and enforce the resource constraints within coun-
tries. As long as production remains within the cone of specialization,
these conditions have no bearing price changes hence I omit them forTRADE COSTS AND RELATIVE PRICE VARIABILITY 9
brevity. Note, however, that if demand shocks are large, they may in-
duce complete specialization, that is, a country could stop producing
a good. This would break down the equalization of the price and the
marginal cost of that good. Nevertheless, such drastic changes in the
patterns of specialization are only likely to occur over the long run.
Market clearing requires the equalization of world prices, hence
c1(w11,w 12)+c0(w11,w 12)=c1(w21,w 22) − c0(w21,w 22), (3.8)
c2(w11,w 12) − c0(w11,w 12)=c2(w21,w 22)+c0(w21,w 22). (3.9)




(θ11 ˆ w11 + θ12 ˆ w12)+
τ11
1+τ11
(t1 ˆ w11 + t2 ˆ w12)=
1
1 − τ21
(θ11 ˆ w21 + θ12 ˆ w22) −
τ21
1 − τ21




(θ21 ˆ w11 + θ22 ˆ w12) −
τ12
1 − τ12
(t1 ˆ w11 − t2 ˆ w12)=
1
1+τ22
(θ21 ˆ w21 + θ22 ˆ w22)+
τ22
1+τ22
(t1 ˆ w21 + t2 ˆ w22),
where θij denotes the share of factor j in producing good i, tj is the
share of factor j used in transportation, and τij is the fraction of the
consumer price of good j spent on transportation in country i.
Adopting straightforward vector-matrix notations (which then gen-
eralize the framework for the N-good case),
(3.12) ˆ pw =[ ( I − Λ1)Θ + Λ1T]ˆ w1 =[ ( I − Λ2)Θ + Λ2T]ˆ w2,
where Λi is the diagonal matrix containing the share of transportation
costs (or, in other words, the deviation of world prices from domestic
prices) in the two sectors in country i (with a positive entry for exports
and a negative for imports), Θ is the input usage matrix in production
and T is the input usage in transportation.
With these notations, we can express consumer prices from factor
prices as
(3.13) ˆ pi = Θˆ wi.10 MIKL´ OS KOREN
In absence of transportation costs (Λ1 = Λ2 = 0), the relationship
among factor prices becomes
(3.14) Θˆ w1 = Θˆ w2,
which implies factor price equalization,
(3.15) ˆ w1 = ˆ w2,
provided that Θ is non-singular, i.e., the two goods use the factors with
diﬀerent intensities.
Another special case results if we assume that shipping good i re-
quires the same factor intensities as producing good i. This is the usual
assumption of iceberg trade costs: transportation uses up a fraction τ
of the good shipped. With our notation, this case can be formulated
as
T = Θ, (3.16)
Θˆ w1 = Θˆ w2, (3.17)
ˆ p1 = ˆ p2. (3.18)
That is, the percentage change of consumer prices is identical in the
two countries even with iceberg transport costs. Note that the level
of prices will generally be diﬀerent, but the prices in the two locations
will move in parallel. This property makes the iceberg cost model
unsuitable to analyze questions such as real exchange rate and terms
of trade volatility. It is also unclear how such a model can justify a
relative price based approach to “border eﬀects” (e.g. Engel and Rogers,
1996; Parsley and Wei, 2001, Kim, Froot and Rogoﬀ, 2002).
Modelling the transportation sector explicitly allows for ﬂuctuations
in the relative price if transportation uses diﬀerent factors intensively
than the export and import sectors.
Proposition 3.1 (The Law of Two Prices). We can express domestic
price relative to world prices as
(3.19) ˆ p1 − ˆ pw = Λ1(I − TΘ
−1)ˆ p1.
In the 2 × 2 case, the vector of relative prices can be written as




λ1(θ11 − t11) −λ1(θ11 − t11)
−λ2(θ21 − t21) λ2(θ21 − t21)

ˆ p1,TRADE COSTS AND RELATIVE PRICE VARIABILITY 11
where θi1 is the share of input 1 in the production of good i (the ﬁrst
element of the ith row of Θ), and λ1 ≡ τ11/(1 + τ11)i st h es h a r eo f
total transportation costs in the consumer price of good 1 (λ2 is deﬁned
similarly).
When is the relative price of good 1 unresponsive to demand shocks?
If either λ1 = 0, that is, if there are no transport costs, or θ11 = t11,t h a t
is, if shipping works with the exact same technology as production of
good 1 (iceberg costs). In general, however, demand shocks do change
the relative price of goods across regions.
Consider the more general case with multiple goods and factors. (I
still assume that the number of traded goods and immobile factors are
the same.) For each sector s deﬁne the 1 × N vector
(3.21) ts ≡ TsΘ
−1,
where Ts is the sth row of the matrix T, listing the factor intensities
of transportation required for sector s. This vector ts measures the
similarity of transportation to each of the sectors in terms of factor





that is, we obtain ts by regressing the transportation factor intensities
on the sectoral factor intensities. Hence if a sector uses similar factors
as transportation, its corresponding entry in ts is high (at the extreme,
for identical factor intensities, the similarity measure is 1). Note that,
by the properties of Θ and T, the components of ts sum to 1.
We can then write the rows of (3.19) as follows,
(3.22) ˆ p1s − ˆ pws = λs(ˆ p1s − tsˆ p1).
Suppose that demand shocks in country 1 have a common and an
idiosyncratic component,
(3.23) ˆ p1s = u1 + ε1s,
with Var(ε1s) ≡ σ2
s and Cov(ε1s,ε 1s) ≡ 0. Since the elements of ts add
up to one, the common demand shock will not aﬀect the relative prices12 MIKL´ OS KOREN
in the two regions.6







The variance of the relative price of good s is then
















The ﬁrst term measures the magnitude of trade costs. In general,
higher trade costs lead to higher relative price volatility. The second
term reﬂects the impact of idiosyncratic demand shocks on volatility.
The contribution of these shocks to volatility depends on the sector’s
similarity to transportation. If a sector is less similar to transportation
(tss is low), demand shocks have more of an impact on the price of the
good relative to transportation and hence on the relative price in the
two regions. The last term is a weighted average of demand shocks
which does not vary across sectors.
4. Estimations
4.1. Data. In the two empirical exercises I use data on consumer prices
in several U.S. cities. The ﬁrst dataset comes from Parsley and Wei
(1996) and includes retail prices (in current dollars) of 51 well-deﬁned
goods in 48 American cities collected by the American Chamber of
Commerce. The goods include durable and perishable goods as well as
services. See Appendix for the exact deﬁnition of the goods. The data
is quarterly running from 1975:1 to 1992:4.
The second dataset comes from Engel and Rogers (2001), including
monthly data on consumer price indices for 48 disaggregate categories
in 28 U.S. cities. I match each good with its corresponding SIC87 sector
and use the 1999 input-output tables to determine the input usage and
transportation margins of these sectors. The index of similarity to
transportation is calculated using the intermediate input shares.7
6Intuitively, if there are no relative price changes then relative factors do not
change, either, so transport margins remain ﬁxed.
7The theory would require factor input shares, which are harder to obtain. Work
is in progress with calculating these shares using the 1997 Annual Survey of Man-
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At a later stage, I will relate DLOOP to trade ﬂows, using the 1997
Commodity Flow Survey, which contains state-to-state shipments in
43 good categories.
All prices are deﬂated by the overall urban CPI for the U.S. Ad-
ditional data include pairwise driving distances between cities (from
http://mapquest.com) and the per barrel price of West Texas Inter-
mediate oil.
4.2. Estimating the Latent Factor Model. Generally speaking, I
ﬁrst run year-by-year cross sectional regressions to uncover the distance-
and location-speciﬁc factors and then run time-series regression for each
of the goods to estimate the factor loading of the good on these two
factors.
Note that, by choice of units of retail and units of transportation,









|pgjt − pgit| = d
γ
ijλt + |rjt − rit|.
By our identiﬁcation assumption the set of export goods exactly coun-
terweights the set of import goods, so levels of “CPI”8 in two cities






(pgjt − pgit)=rjt − rit.
Once the retail factors have been obtained, I subtract them from the
consumer price and regress the resulting price gap on distance to obtain






|(pgjt − pgit) − (rjt − rit)| = d
γ
ijλt.
The parameter γ is taken from Hummels (2001) to be 0.25.9 This says
that transportation costs only mildly rise with distance. For example,
8I calculate the average consumer price by ﬁrst normalizing all the good prices by
their 1990 New Orleans prices and then taking a simple arithmetic average. This
ensures that my consumer price index is not dominated by any particular good.
Unfortunately, this requires a balanced panel of products and cities, limiting the
data to 1980–1992.
9Alternatively, one could estimate it using nonlinear techniques.14 MIKL´ OS KOREN
shipping a good from New Orleans to New York city (1,176 miles) is
39% more expensive than shipping it to Houston TX (311 miles).
Figure 1 shows the time series of the bandpass-ﬁltered transportation
factor.10 Because the BP ﬁlter gets rid of the ﬁrst and last 6 quarters,
and the retail factor can only be estimated for the end of the sample, I
also plot an alternative retail factor, estimated without controlling for
retail diﬀerences in Figure 2.
The factor can be best interpreted as the price of transportation. As
a comparison, I also include the BP-ﬁltered real price of WTI oil in both
graphs. (All time series are normalized to have zero mean and unitary
standard deviation.) The comovement between both transportation
factors and the oil price is surprisingly close at the business-cycle fre-
quency. Even though there may be some phase shift with the simpler
factor (factor2), both factors math the overall trends, the troughs and
booms of the oil price.
Next I estimate the factor loadings of each good and look at how
much of the total price variation is explained by these two trade factors.
This can be carried out in two ways, using either the cross sectional
or the time series variation in deviations from the law of one price. In
both cases, the two factors explain a substantial fraction of variation
in the DLOOP for many goods. The cross sectional (within-year) R2
ranges from 0.01 to 0.34 with an average of 0.11. The time-series
(within-city) R2 ranges from 0 to 0.14 with an average of 0.03. For
highly traded products such as canned food, vegetables, meat products,
household supplies etc. the fraction of variance is consistently higher
in both dimensions.
Table X reports the factor loadings of the products. As the units of
products diﬀer (though all product prices are converted to 1990 New
Orleans dollars, it is clear that $1 of liquor does not necessarily require
the same amount of transportation and retailing as $1 of eggs), it is not
meaningful to compare the factor loadings directly across products. I
therefore calculate the relative importance of transportation as τg/(τg+
µg), which is invariant to unit of measurement problems.
10I only look at business-cycle frequencies (between 6 and 32 quarters) because
(i) the factor is probably estimated with an error and (ii) the relevant adjustments
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The table lists the products in declining importance of transporta-
tion. Overall, traded products tend to be at the top of the list while
nontraded service prices tend to be more retail than transport intensive
(with some exceptions).
4.3. Similarity to Transportation and Relative Price Variabil-
ity. Next I look at whether the time-series variation in the DLOOP is
related to similarity of the sector to transportation as predicted by the
model. I use the monthly CPI data of Engel and Rogers (2001) (see
above).
Similarity to transportation is calculated from the use tables of the
1999 Input Output Accounts. Transportation is deﬁned to include
Motor freight and warehousing, Rail, Water and Air Transportation.
The IO tables also list the transportation margins of each of the sectors
(the fraction of total shipments spent on transportation), which I use
as a measure of tradability.11
I calculate the time series variation in the DLOOP for each good
category and each city pair in three ways. First I regress the (log
diﬀerenced) price index in city 1 on the price index in city 2. If the
LOOP holds, the coeﬃcient of this regression should be one. I use
(β − 1)2 as a measure of the time-series deviation from the LOOP.
Second, I take the simple correlation of price changes in the two cities.
Third, I divide the variance of the relative price change by the variance
of price changes in city 2.12
Table X reports the results of simply correlating these measures with
distance, the transport margin of the good and its similarity to trans-
portation. According to all three measures, the DLOOP is more volatile
(and the correlation is lower) if the cities are farther apart. This is in
line with the evidence of Engel and Rogers (1996), (2000), (2001). At
the same time, the prices goods with a higher transport margin tend
to move closer together. This is the puzzling ﬁnding of Engel and
Rogers (2001). When we control for the sector’s similarity to trans-
portation, we see that goods similar to transportation (closer to the
11This obviously underestimates the eﬀective margin since products with a high
margin are not traded.
12Some goods have simply more volatile demand so it is useful to scale by the
overall volatility of the good’s price.16 MIKL´ OS KOREN
iceberg assumptions) exhibit lower DLOOP variability. Moreover, the
coeﬃcient on the transport margin of products attains the “right” sign
(if marginally signiﬁcant). That is, given the same degree of similarity,
goods that are costlier to trade have more volatile DLOOP. This pat-
tern was hidden because similarity and transport margin are positively
correlated.
5. Conclusions
The paper investigates whether deviations from the law of one price
can attributed to real factors, such as transportation and distribution
costs. Instead of the usual iceberg assumption, I model costly trade as a
transportation sector that uses real resources with potentially diﬀerent
factor intensities than the production of the good.
A latent factor model analysis shows that distance speciﬁc (“trans-
portation”) and location speciﬁc (“retailing”) factors can explain 10-20
percent of the deviations from the law of one price across U.S. cities.
When the price of transportation is determined in general equilib-
rium, the variance of relative prices at diﬀerent locations is high if (i)
the good is costly to transport and (ii) it is produced with diﬀerent
factor intensities than transportation. Preliminary empirical results
suggest that goods similar to transportation in terms of factor inten-
sity have indeed lower relative price variability. As these goods tend to
be costly to ship, this helps resolve the puzzling ﬁnding of Engel and
Rogers (2001) that less tradable goods have less volatile relative prices.
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-2 -1 0 1 2
real_oil_price_bpGood Transport Retail XS R2
Relative 
transport
bacon 0.801 -0.298 0.099 1.000
Beauty salon 0.721 -0.103 0.032 1.000
beer 1.085 -0.546 0.063 1.000
bowling 0.896 -0.149 0.060 1.000
Canned Peaches 0.659 -0.037 0.030 1.000
canned tomatoes 1.030 -0.132 0.053 1.000
coffee 1.572 -0.402 0.077 1.000
corn flakes 0.764 -0.058 0.060 1.000
dentist 0.754 -0.007 0.042 1.000
dry cleaning 0.497 -0.084 0.036 1.000
fried chicken 1.063 -0.002 0.071 1.000
frozen corn 0.436 -0.192 0.030 1.000
Liquor 0.639 -0.029 0.045 1.000
Man's shirt 0.967 -0.218 0.053 1.000
McDonalds 1.418 -0.049 0.071 1.000
Shampoo 1.709 -0.136 0.109 1.000
shortening 0.412 -0.138 0.016 1.000
sugar 0.711 -0.018 0.047 1.000
tissue 0.496 -0.200 0.040 1.000
wine 0.526 -0.192 0.011 1.000
steak 1.659 0.074 0.212 0.957
lettuce 1.842 0.099 0.124 0.949
Canned Orange Juice 0.701 0.050 0.060 0.934
tennis balls 1.557 0.249 0.060 0.862
canned tuna 1.786 0.307 0.092 0.853
doctor 0.891 0.199 0.049 0.817
game 2.359 0.538 0.170 0.814
whole chicken 2.076 0.485 0.182 0.811
soft drink 1.622 0.396 0.111 0.804
washing powder 2.361 0.577 0.142 0.804
potatoes 1.075 0.271 0.112 0.799
Auto maintenance 1.464 0.411 0.169 0.781
bananas 0.696 0.259 0.118 0.728
underwear 1.029 0.383 0.063 0.728
Baby food 1.133 0.434 0.124 0.723
bread 0.437 0.187 0.110 0.700
canned peas 0.734 0.350 0.058 0.677
toothpaste 0.483 0.255 0.057 0.655
hospital room 1.859 0.996 0.283 0.651
cheese 0.326 0.212 0.027 0.606
eggs 0.487 0.330 0.144 0.596
man's haircut 1.123 1.007 0.167 0.527
asprin 0.809 0.874 0.098 0.481
Appliance repair 1.277 1.620 0.290 0.441
margarine 1.054 1.396 0.245 0.430
ground beef 1.064 1.435 0.270 0.426
movie 0.806 1.088 0.193 0.426
Jeans 0.997 2.072 0.342 0.325
Pizza 0.069 0.167 0.009 0.292
milk 0.081 1.693 0.219 0.045
cigarettes -0.853 1.087 0.106 0.000
Average 0.984 0.324 0.107
Factor loadings from cross sectionGood Transport Retail TS R2
Relative 
transport
coffee -0.888 -0.402 0.016
Man's shirt -0.182 -0.218 0.001
sugar -0.042 -0.018 0.004
bacon 1.692 -0.298 0.136 1.000
Beauty salon 0.414 -0.103 0.010 1.000
beer 1.177 -0.546 0.053 1.000
bowling 0.392 -0.149 0.006 1.000
Canned Peaches 0.559 -0.037 0.011 1.000
canned tomatoes 0.829 -0.132 0.027 1.000
corn flakes 0.642 -0.058 0.040 1.000
dentist 0.204 -0.007 0.005 1.000
dry cleaning 0.326 -0.084 0.009 1.000
fried chicken 0.547 -0.002 0.009 1.000
frozen corn 0.590 -0.192 0.030 1.000
Liquor 0.090 -0.029 0.008 1.000
McDonalds 0.219 -0.049 0.002 1.000
Shampoo 0.955 -0.136 0.035 1.000
shortening 0.278 -0.138 0.011 1.000
tissue 0.086 -0.200 0.005 1.000
wine 0.333 -0.192 0.010 1.000
steak 1.165 0.074 0.038 0.940
lettuce 0.882 0.099 0.015 0.899
canned tuna 1.886 0.307 0.042 0.860
washing powder 2.638 0.577 0.105 0.820
whole chicken 1.603 0.485 0.054 0.768
tennis balls 0.656 0.249 0.006 0.725
Auto maintenance 1.000 0.411 0.051 0.709
canned peas 0.467 0.350 0.024 0.572
game 0.672 0.538 0.009 0.555
Baby food 0.435 0.434 0.008 0.501
bananas 0.240 0.259 0.005 0.481
eggs 0.303 0.330 0.040 0.479
movie 0.823 1.088 0.119 0.431
Jeans 1.055 2.072 0.082 0.337
underwear 0.137 0.383 0.001 0.264
cigarettes 0.373 1.087 0.041 0.256
potatoes 0.060 0.271 0.006 0.181
margarine 0.301 1.396 0.067 0.177
cheese 0.043 0.212 0.035 0.168
milk 0.276 1.693 0.010 0.140
Appliance repair -0.691 1.620 0.028 0.000
asprin -1.452 0.874 0.036 0.000
bread -0.025 0.187 0.006 0.000
Canned Orange Juice -0.400 0.050 0.012 0.000
doctor -0.286 0.199 0.039 0.000
ground beef -0.110 1.435 0.002 0.000
hospital room -0.042 0.996 0.029 0.000
man's haircut -1.487 1.007 0.046 0.000
Pizza -0.295 0.167 0.037 0.000
soft drink -0.899 0.396 0.026 0.000
toothpaste -0.451 0.255 0.087 0.000
Average 0.335 0.324 0.030
Factor loadings from time seriesBeta(p1-p2,p2)^2 Correlation(p1,p2) Var(p1-p2)/Var(p2)
1 234 56789




* – 1.1561 0.3299










Observations 1,159 1,216 1,216 1,159 1,216 1,216 1,159 1,216 1,216
R2 0.010 0.003 0.012 0.011 0.003 0.026 0.021 0.001 0.001